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ABSTRACT 
As the prevailing marker of the development of human productive forces, and as 
utilised as a historical paradigm for the justification of Artificial Intelligence technologies 
as the necessary and eventual feature of human life, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is 
driven by cultural assumptions and intellectual presuppositions that are informed by 
the presently hegemonic Western intellectual heritage.  The problem identified and 
elucidated in this chapter is that this epistemic status of this socio-industrial 
development is set asymmetrically against Africa. Africa does not produce but mainly 
consume and use these technologies that are designed and manufactured in alien 
cultural settings. I here go further and highlight that this problem does not only have 
cultural and geopolitical implications, but that it has fundamental existential 
ramifications, as the dynamics of human-technology interaction  as unveiled by the 
postphenomenological method indicate that technology does frame human self-
knowledge and modes of sociality. Casting this as both an epistemological and socio-
ontological crisis, the chapter declares that this status quo, the skewed appropriation 
of A.I. technologies by Africa, and the effects thereof, constitute a status quaestionis, an 
imperative for critical systematic exploration.  
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1. Introduction 
Under the prevailing ideology of the globalisation of the so-named Fourth Industrial 
Revolution modern technologies are expressly produced for global consumption. 
However, the scientific paradigm that shapes the nature and use of these technologies, 
including their digitalisation of human life, is derived from a geo-economic base that is 
constituted by a particularised political and geo-cultural circuity. Since the First 
Industrial Revolution, the Euro-American epistemic tradition and intellectual heritage 
have ascended into a position of a hegemon on scientific research and technological 
innovation, whilst Africa remains trapped into the status of a net importer and 
consumer of this technology that happens to be moulding her self-knowledge and 
social character. The framing and problematisation of this geo-economic reality, with a 
highlight of its cultural geneology and epistemic ramifications, is the mission of this 
chapter.   I here aim to registered that the critical explication of the cultural and political 
dynamics relating to the production of knowledge and the design of technological 
artefacts is the most urgent task of contemporary African Social Science and 
Philosophy.  
Drawing from categories derived from the philosophical-phenomenology 
method, I aim to demonstrate that for Africa, which for purposes of this chapter is 
framed and affirmed1 as both a geo-political and a geo-cultural collective entity, the 
“consumption” and use of these technologies that are designed with alien cultural 
assumptions, and from an asymmetrical techno-economic position, render the 
collective intentionality2 of Africans vulnerable to a myriad of socio-ontological 
                                                          
1 This affirmation is asserted in disagreement with postulates that question the existence of Africa as 
a locus of socio-political and geocultural analysis, such as Mudimbe (1988) and  Appiah (1992) 
2 “Collective intentionality refers to intentions, beliefs, commitments and actions that people have 
and do collectively. The collective intentionality approach to social ontology then holds that 
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pathologies (see for example, Birhane 2020). The urgent imperative for the systematic 
interrogation of this status quo, I argue, constitutes a status quaestionis on Africa’s 
socio-historical place in the fourth industrial revolution.  
Compared to preceding technoscientific developments that are typically 
conceived as a linear series of successive global industrial revolutions, the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution has a deliberative direction and a distinctly socio-philosophical 
character (Schwab  2015; 2016). The First Industrial Revolution, as a fundamental change 
in the global economy that was occasioned by a breakthrough in the application of 
technological knowledge into industrial processes erupted in England around the 1750s, 
ignited by the industrialisation of steam combustion technology. The subsequent 
development, the Second Industrial Revolution was marked by further innovation in the 
industrial harnessing of energy, the invention of electricity and the oil combustion 
engine that enabled mass factory production and transportation. This is dated from the 
1870s well into the twentieth century. The marker of the transition from the Second to 
the Third Industrial Revolution is the enhancement of computing processing power 
since the 1960s. From thence, due to the revolutionary effects of the emergence of the 
internet and the confluence of this with breakthoughs in the technologisation of 
artificial intelligence, the lines between the Third and the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
are blurred (see Rifkin 2011). The latter is distinguishing itself as the distinct application 
of artificial intelligence as a ‘tool’ of not only optimising economic production but also 
for facilitating new ways of experience life as a human person.  
As authoritatively articulated by the founder and Chairman of the World 
Economic Forum and a global proponent of “The Fourth Industrial Revolution”, German 
engineer and economist, Klaus Schwab: 
The fourth industrial revolution… is not only about smart and connected 
machines and systems. Its scope is much wider. Occurring simultaneously 
                                                          
collective intentionality is not merely a local curiosity, one among many kinds of social phenomena, 
but has constitutive relevance for social and institutional reality in general”  (Laitenn 2017, 147)  
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are waves of further breakthroughs in areas ranging from gene 
sequencing to nanotechnology, from renewables to quantum computing. 
It is the fusion of these technologies and their interaction across physical, 
digital, and biological domains that make the fourth industrial revolution 
fundamentally different from previous revolutions (Schwab 2016, 8).  
Of critical concern for us is that the scientific paradigm that is systematically 
inaugurating this revolution in the re-engineering of the human, the digitalisation of 
human existence and modes of sociality, is driven by culturo-epistemic presuppositions 
that are exclusively and ethnocentrically informed by the Western intellectual heritage 
with its self-endowed belief in its universality and supremacy (see Lyotard 1984; Bostrom 
2005; Floridi 2014). It is thus perplexing to read echoes of the anthropological vision of 
this epistemological hegemony in the national technology policy strategies of African 
states, such as the recent report of the “South African Government-European Union 
Strategic Dialogue Partnership on 4IR”. This partnership is proclaimed as premised on 
embracing the Fourth Industrial Revolution “as representing new ways in which 
technology becomes embedded within societies and the human body” (SA-EU 
Conference 2018, 10).The ideology that is driving this socio-engineering movement calls 
for the urgent decentring of this Eurocentric model of thought in  Science, Technology 
and Innovation (STI).  
Tandem to the amptly documented entanglement of postcolonial African political 
authorities into neocolonial arrangements of power, and their oblivion to the social and 
humanistic complexities accompanying artificial intelligence technology, much of 
academic knowledge on the African continent remains trapped in an epistemological 
framework and a pedagogic canon that persist in its ties with the colonial legacy of this 
Occidental tradition (see Rashied & Bhamjee 2020,100; Eze 1997, 339-344). There is 
a lacuna of a discursive practice of African Philosophy of Science and Technology that 
would be crafted from endogenous African epistemological and ethical frameworks, 
and more specifically, an Afrocentric critical corpus on the ramifications of the fourth 
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industrial revolution for African peoples and societies. Seminal reflections such as Paulin 
Hountondji (1990) and Kwame Gyekye (1997) have laid the foundation, but no 
structured formulations of contemporary African philosophical theories of technology 
are forthcoming. 
This chapter, however, is in the tradition of a position paper. It aims at only being 
a declaration and description of the problematique of the ramifications of how artificial 
intelligence technologies are designed and produced, and exogenously proliferated 
into Africa. I tentatively raise a range of issues as provocations for further systematic 
elaboration. These issues, I must declare upfront, are raised from, or as revealed by the 
critical prism of an anticolonial Africanist phenomenological practice, as opposed to an 
abstract “postcolonial” social epistemology. The hope is to 
stimulate transformative research projects that will contribute to the recuperation of 
Africa’s cultural sovereignty, global posture, and self-representation within this 
technological era.  
 The import of discussion unfolds through, firstly, a justification of the instance of 
the status quaestionis herein adumbrated. This is followed by an elaboration of the 
epistemic and ontological issues that stem from the cultural and political factors that 
I discern to be intertwined with the technological process. Given the culture-centric 
leitmotif of my disquisition, I conclude with pertinent reflections on the question of 
an appropriate theoretical approach for an Afrocentric techno-science in the context 
of a multi-cultural and globalising world. 
 
2. The Challenge of Technology for Africa  
The consensus in technoscience literature on the sociology and philosophy of 
technology is that technology qua technology is neither culturally innocuous nor 
politically neutral. As an exemplary trail: Harry Woolf edited an anthology in 1964 on 
Science as a Cultural Force; Don Ihde  (1993) published on “technology as a cultural 
instrument”;  Albert  Borgmann (2006) on “technology as a cultural force”,  and recently, 
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Arun Kumar Tripathi edited a special issue of the journal A.I. and Society with the theme 
“Hermeneutics and technological culture” (Tripathi 2017). Around the same time as 
Woolf’s Euro-American project, Kwame Nkrumah had monumentally alerted of the 
intellectual-cultural challenges which are latent in Africa’s path towards technological 
advancement as a sovereign global player in, inter alia, “The African Genius” (1963).  The 
crux of our immediate problem, however, is best crystallised by Patricia Fara (2009) in 
her observation pertaining to science, which mutatis mutandis is applicable to 
technology, that “what counts as scientific depends not only on the natural world but 
also on who is doing research – and where and when”, concluding that “scientific, 
commercial, and political interests are intertwined” (Fara 2009, xvii). In corroboration, 
Shoshana Zuboff (2019) has detailed how a capitalistic culture of surveillance of human 
beings for not only their control but for the commodification of their life as producers 
of data which is monetised for commercial ends, has become the dominant motive of 
twenty-first-century social existence (see Jameson 1984).  
It can be demonstrated that the processes of innovation and production of 
technological artefacts, as well as the flows of their distribution, are not only dictated 
by political and commercial motives; they are also driven by culturally-vested interests 
which are often covertly expressed and at some instances unwittingly overt (Birhane 
2020). This is crucial, for as alerted by Bertasio (1993, 249) “any scientific-technological 
event immediately assumes a great relevance because it involves central cultural 
elements on which culture itself rests: rationality, utility, ethics, freedom, sociality”. This 
cultural element, in which “culture” is understood in its broadest sense that includes its 
meaning-giving function to human life as a shared existence, sheds light on the 
complexity of human-technology interaction. It leads to my elucidation of how 
technology moulds human subjectivity, and what the implications of this are for the 
Africa that is enmeshed into technologies it does not produce. I thus alert that given 
the nature of the epistemic and socio-ontological vulnerabilities that Africa is exposed 
to amid this exuberant technological revolution that is shaping modern society, there 
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is an imperative and urgency to subject the ontology of the prevailing ecosystem of 
digital technologies to the prism an Africanist anticolonial critical evaluation. 
The political dimension of technology (see Coeckelbergh 2016) and the 
economic geography of the current flow of technological knowledge and innovation 
underscore that the epistemic imperative alluded above is, in fact, a social-ontological 
crisis. The prevailing global power matrix that is governing systems of production and 
distribution of technological artefacts operate at the detriment of the epistemic 
sovereignty of societies with the geo-economic positionality such as that on nearly all 
African countries. There is a well-entrenched grand-narrative, in fact, an interpretative 
archetype according to which the global kaleidoscope of the direction of sophistication 
in technological advancement is understood. According to this gestalt, the movement 
of technological innovation and production is routinely visualised through a heuristic 
of a geographic-economic centre-periphery axis. The industrially advanced countries 
are the centre, the Global North. They are the vortex of research and innovation in 
science and technology. The periphery is the countries of the erstwhile Third World. In 
the parlance of this grand-narrative that grades the capacities of human populations 
to consume technologies emanating from the centre, the periphery, that happily3 self-
identifies as the “Global South”, is referred to as the “Emerging Market”. Various indices 
and studies indicate that within this Global South, with the exception of sparse but 
notable sparkles of  “world-class” technological outputs in Asia and South America, 
sub-Saharan Africa4 epitomises the slackness of the economic and technological 
sophistication of this Periphery. Judging from the levels of electrification of the 
continent, it can be averred that Africa is still stuck between the second and third 
industrial revolutions. 
Towards a critical postcolonial evaluation of this situation, Ramon Grosfoguel, a 
leading Latin American exponent of the decoloniality movement that explores this as a 
                                                          
3  See, for example  Maldonado-Torres (2011); de Sousa Santos (2014); Rashied and Bhamjee (2020). 
4 According to the Oxford Insights global index of government readiness for artificial intelligence, not 




colonial power matrix5 that stems from a history of European sub-humanisation of non-
European peoples, once pondered:  
We [people of the “Global South”] went from the sixteenth-century 
characterization of “people without writing” to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century characterization of “people without history,” to the 
twentieth-century characterization of “people without development” and 
more recently, to the early twenty-first century of “people without 
democracy” (Grosfoguel 2007: 214).  
I add that Africans are now gazed as a “people without science and technology”. In 
1990, Hountondji exclaimed in exasperation that “We have not produced a microscope.  
We do not master even the first step in the chain – the making of research instruments, 
the production of the means of production” (1990,10).  
The self-depracation, pessimism, and confusion on the discourse on the 
possibility of an African technoscientific practice persist well into the twenty-first 
century,  as epitomised by the featuring of Kai Horsthemke’s argument against the 
existence of an indigenous African scientific paradigm in Afolayan and Falola’s The 
Pelgrave Handbook of African Philosophy (Horsthemke 2017, 585-603).  The 
inauguration of profiles of certain global universities as leading centres of research in 
science and technology, and practices of academic publications venerated for the 
validation of these research outputs, are part of this epistemic-economic vortex of “the 
First World” that peripheralises and systematically extinguishes possibilities of Africa-
centred technological innovation. At this Global North epistemic centre, the orthodoxy 
of what is science and “world-class” is pontificated and canonised. Indigenous 
                                                          
5 “The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not 
evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We 
continue to live under the same ‘colonial power matrix’ . . . Although ‘colonial administrations’ have 
been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into 
independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European/EuroAmerican 
exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-Europeans remain 
in place and are entangled with the “international division of labour” and accumulation of capital at 
a world-scale (Grosfoguel 2007, 219). 
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knowledge systems and technoscientific paradigms, models and vocabulary continue 
to be marginalised and rejected as the heterodoxy of science and primitive technology. 
As a consequence of this epistemic regime, the epochal Artificial Intelligence 
technologies that define the current (socio-)industrial revolution are purposed, 
designed, and manufactured from the global economic “centre”, a geo-epistemic locale 
that is not only alien to Africa but is hierarchically self-imposing. Africa is being washed 
over by a xenocentric industrial revolution. As the crucial philosophic phenomenon of 
the meaning of being human continues to be reshaped by this scientific revolution, the 
question of the position of Africa in the global scheme of the production and 
consumption patterns of these technologies protrudes as a veritable status quaestionis, 
a theoretic crisis compelling a systematised critical inquiry. 
Writing from the experiential point of India, Arun Kumar Tripathi posed two 
searing questions that are germane to all non-Western consumers of A.I. technologies. 
He asked:  “Do we have access to the technologies that we need?”  and “Do we need 
the technology that we have?” (Tripathi 2017, 146).  These are questions about 
xenocentric science and technology that Western-technology-consuming Africans have 
to confront. This amongst others, should compel an anticoloniality-conscious inquiry to 
probe the following interconnected fundamental questions: Whose existential day-to-
day needs motivate endeavours of technoscientific research, and, why and how do the 
products arising from this process reach and affect those who they were in the first 
instance not intended for.   
Any well-traveled technophilic resident of Africa is aware that technological 
innovations from the global industrial centers enter the “African market” in a pattern 
resembling a wave. It is not uncommon to notice some gadget, or latest version of a 
computing software program or cellphone in a shop in California, Dubai, or Shanghai, 
which would only reach and gain social currency in Africa a year or later. And some of 
these innovations and gargets never even reach Africa. Who decides which of the array 
of technologies flowing from Silicon Valley and the manufacturing hubs of China reach 
Africa, and which are to be withheld? Market forces? In any case, the fundamental 
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question remains: were these technologies not designed for the cultural realities from 
which they were manufactured, attuned to the specific cultural proclivities and needs 
of their designers and producers? Granted globalisation, the posthuman universal 
nature of human needs, and the pragmatism of global market economics: why is it 
presumed that these technological devices and systems (such as social media 
platforms) are seamlessly appropriate for the life values and social challenges obtaining 
in African communities? Or is it assumed that Africans will readily adapt themselves to 
these technologies? Are these technologies not portended to remould African Being 
into that of the cultural ontology from whence the technologies originate, given the 
body of evidence on the symbiotic mutual-production of technology and society? (see 
Harbers 2005). 
 
3. The Ontic-Ontological Ramifications of Technology 
Articulated poignantly, the question driving the foregoing elaboration of the status quo 
pertaining to the  geo-economic and cultural-epistemic challenges latent in Africa’s 
relationship with  modern technologies, which constitutes my proposition of a status 
quaestionis is: How can the inexorable effects of a scientific-technological paradigm in 
whose formulation Africans have not participated nor contributed, and is yet shaping 
their being, be countervailed? This is a matter which, notwithstanding the “position 
paper” nature of this chapter, demands immediate exposition, which I now turn to 
briefly illuminate. 
At issue, at least for the academic discipline of philosophy, is the ontology of 
technology. What, in essence, is technology? And how does our conception and 
understanding of it relates to its effects on our lives?  Classical (Western!) philosophy 
of technology has traditionally viewed technology through the premise of “the tool”, 
and as such, as an Object, and the human user, as the Subject who decides the shape 
and applications of this tool in line with her requirements.  Technology has been 
conceived as a scientific practice and skill in the making of these instruments that enable 
human life in its ever-changing environments. This opened up a recognition of the locus 
11 
 
of technology as a force that unveils the processes of meaning-making, self-
representation, and self-situation for both its producers and users. A hubris of this field 
of philosophical inquiry has fascinated modern philosophers since Martin Heidegger’s 
essay The Question Concerning Technology (Heidegger 1977 [1954], 13-35). It is now 
being creatively applied to broader social dynamics by sociologists (see Webster 1995), 
phenomenologists of technology (see Verbeek 1993; 2005), and computational 
semioticians (see Gudwin and Gomide 1997). 
Heidegger’s seminal contribution, deriving from his existentialist thought was a 
postulation that technology, as techne, is a mode of self-making know-how6. This 
established that technological objects are not mere objects (noumena), but that they 
are part of the reality that is ineluctably ready-at-hand, that enmeshes the human user 
into a process of self-understanding, revealing her world. Technology exerts itself on 
them human ontic-ontologically, meaning, as something that affects how the human 
person gets to understand her world and self. It enables the user to self-actualise and 
self-situate as a being-in-the-world, as beyond its immediate facilitative impact, it  also 
reveals (poeisis) what characterises a given time-period in which one becomes, their 
umwelt. (Heidegger 1977[1954], 24) 
Building on this Heideggerian philosophical tradition in the age of the computer 
and Artificial Intelligence, Peter-Paul Verbeek, and other so-called 
postphenomenologists, set out to reverse the Subject-Object classical schema of the 
phenomenological method (see Lindberg 2019). Technological objects, they insist, 
spontaneously impinge onto the human subject’s realm of self-experience, the 
intentional (intentionality) space. Drawing attention to this “technological intentionality” 
which is at play during the interlocution and interface between humans and machines, 
especially intelligent devices, Verbeek (2005,125-146), Ihde (2003, 131-144) and others 
(Harbers 2005) inaugurated the phenomenological sovereignty of the Object, the tool. 
                                                          
6 “For technology does not go back to the techne  of the Greeks in name only but derives historically 
and essentially from techne as a mode of altheueina, mode, that is, of rendering beings manifest” 
Heidegger in “ Letter on Humanism” (Heidegger 1985[1947], 293) 
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They have mounted an argument that proves the power of technology to shape and 
frame both our living spaces and our self-consciousness (see Walter et al 2019). As 
Verbeek would explain, “when technologies are used, they co-shape human-world 
relationships: they make possible practices and experiences, and in so doing, they play 
an active role in the way humans can be present in their world and vice versa” (Verbeek 
2005, 140). The veracity of his postulate has amply been demonstrated in the interaction 
by humans with human-like robots (humanoids), in the way that these artificial 
machines evoke psychic-emotive responses from us. Think of sex robots. The same 
theory applies to the electronic bots that harass us into wearing our safety belts in our 
modern automobiles (see Coeckelbergh 2018). 
The postphenomenological valorisation of the ontology of technological objects 
has immensely profound implications for a socio-cultural polity that has no control over 
the production of the technologies that it is using; technologies which, it can now be 
demonstrated, shape its collective self-perception, self-actualisation, and self-situation 
in the world. As I alert below, in such a case, an ontological disequilibrium sets in 
between the collective intentionality of such an socio-cultural polity and that of an alien 
geo-culturally charged technological intentionality.  As the human user is “forced” to 
adapt to using a strange and complicated device, an asymmetry of influence occurs 
between the user and the technological device, in which the latter assumes greater 
ontic-ontological influence. The culturally disadvantaged user is thus simultaneously 
mesmerised and alienated by an object that imposes itself as instrumental for the 
efficiencies of her life; during the same experience she must align her way of doing 
things to the intricacies of the operation of this device or machine, as well as to the 
social role it is cast to serve in her life. 
Accordingly, a postcolonial critical theory that is premised on this 
postphenomenological articulation of technology cannot but take into account the 
implications of the global economic standing of those countries that have not, or 
cannot, deliver technological innovations of global significance. What are the 
psychological dynamics of their wonder and fascination at these imported smart 
13 
 
devices and systems that are running their lives beyond comprehension and control? 
Are these technologies fetishes which are imbued with alien powers, emblems of the 
superior intellectual capabilities of foreign commercial and political powers?  Doesn’t 
this cement a vicious circle of negative self-representation and ascriptions of 
“backwardness” at both the personal and national levels? These are the ontological 
ramifications of technology as human society advances deeper into the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, a situation that makes the position of Africa in the global scheme 
of the design, production, and consumption of technology gravely acute.  
For Africa, the dangers of the mechanism of the technological-ontic asymmetry 
described above as the plausibility of the ontological disequilibrium between an artefact 
and the user are vividly apparent in socio-technological systems. The case of socially-
placed robots that are designed with physiological-aesthetic features that resemble 
non-Africans but are meant for deployment and use in African homes, emblematically 
illustrate this phenomenon. The design and deployment/purchase/use of socially-
situated human-like robots raise a multitude of profoundly theoretical and ethical 
challenges on the present and future modes of appropriation of technology by Africans. 
The velocity of the conundrum they present is wide and circuitous. It revolves around 
aesthetics, politics, and psychology. It is about the engineering-design politics of how 
the humanoid robots are built to look like, to the kind of the social roles they are made 
to assume in the human space, and how, in turn, this affects the self-perception of their 
African user (see Lamola 2020).  
The perspective proposed in this status quaestionis is that an African disquisition 
around A.I. has to move beyond protestations against bias in algorithms and the socio-
aesthetics of humanoids, that is, how their “look” portends gender and racial 
stereotypes in society, to how these representations,  phenomenologically, affect the 
psychic-ontology of their “users”. Taking on from the critical research already published 
on the racial bias on algorithms, as epitomised by Ruha Benjamin’s Race after 
Technology (2019) an extended investigation should interrogate the intellectual-
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ontological ramifications of the geo-cultural origins of all technological devices, which 
according to the status quo, reaches peoples of African descent exogenetically. This is 
the type of inquiry that could thrust Black and African existential phenomenology into 
the arena of the philosophy of technology, extending work such as that of Lewis Gordon 
(2000). An illustrative inquiry in this regard would be the question of whether a socially 
disempowered black rural African woman could feel looked-down upon, undermined 
of bullied by a white-male like a robot (see Sparrow 2019). How are the poor and 
marginalised relating to the machines they have to fiddle with every time they have to 
get their disparately needed remittances from the bank? Most of the voice bots are in 
languages which they are not conversant in, which are spoken by persons associated 
with social positionalities that are not normally friendly with them.  
With a cultivated hermeneutic of suspicion which is appropriate for persons in 
the socially marginalised global periphery of the techno-economic arena, Africans have 
to instinctively ask at all times: Where was this gadget designed and manufactured?  
Which problems was it directed to solve, and how was it intended to enhance the 
livelihood of the originary beneficiaries of that solution in their environment?  
 
4. The singularity of an African contribution 
From an ideological-methodological perspective, the Afrocentric analysis ventilated 
thus far could provoke the standard retort about the need to guard against cultural 
chauvinism in science, and the moral responsibility of African postcolonial thought to 
take the reality of the cosmopolitan nature of the modern world into account.  These 
are sentiments traditionally championed by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2018. Two 
important, albeit subliminal contestations, are latent in these concerns. The first one is, 
why must we have a specialised, exclusively African discourse whilst dealing with science 
(and technology)? What is so peculiar about Africa?  The second contestation pertains 
to the nature of the methodological complexity involving a situationally “particular” and 
a “universalist” epistemology. Both of these contestations were comprehensively 
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addressed by Aimé Césaire as discursive themes in a manner that still retains perennial 
valence in his 1956 letter of resignation from the Communist Party of France. 
On the implicit question around the Afrocentrism we have demonstrated 
throughout our foregoing discussion, Césaire wrote: 
We . . .  have come to grasp, in our consciousness, the full breadth of our 
singular peculiarity, and are ready to assume on all levels and in all areas 
the responsibilities that flow from this coming to consciousness. The 
peculiarity  of our “situation in the world,” which cannot be confused with 
any other. The peculiarity  of our problems, which cannot be reduced to 
any other problem. The perculairity of our history, constructed out of 
terrible misfortunes that belong to no one else. The perculairity  of our 
culture, which we wish to live in a way that is more and more real. What 
else can be the result of this but that our paths toward the future—all our 
paths, political as well as cultural—are not yet charted? That they are yet 
to be discovered, and that the responsibility for this discovery belongs to 
no one but us? (Césaire [1956] 2010, 151) 
The paucity of a robust singularly Afrocentric sociology and philosophy of technology 
that will feed the spirit of endogenous innovation is a challenge that awaits tackling by 
Africans, conscientised to solve African problems in an African way. What about the 
danger of this leading to a closed particularism that could be impervious to the 
demands for collaboration and the universal principles and procedures that define 
scientific inquiry? Again, the sagacity of Cesaire on this matter remains unsurpassed:   
Provincialism? Not at all! I am not burying myself in a narrow 
particularism. But neither do I want to lose myself in an emaciated 
[disembodied] universalism. There are two ways to lose oneself: walled 
segregation in the particular or dilution in the “universal.” My conception 
of the universal is that of a universal enriched by all that is particular, a 
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universal enriched by every particular: the deepening and coexistence of 
all particulars. (Césaire [1956] 2010, 152) 
African self-experience, knowledge systems, and ways of life have been interrupted and 
violated by the social history of Western Modernity even before the first industrial 
revolution. This includes the historical plunder of African human capital by the Trans-
Atlantic Slave Trade. An emergence from this reality, which temporally is by no means 
“historical”, in the past, as prevailing vestiges of neo-colonialism attest, demands an 
unapologetic search for both intellectual and material tools for the self-recuperation of 
Africa.  This sense of confident urgency has been immortalised  by Cesaire’s erstwhile 
pupil and protégé, Frantz Omar Fanon in his last published words in the closing 
paragraphs of The Wretched of the Earth:  
Come, then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must 
find something different.  Today we can do everything, so long as we do 
not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed with the desire to 
catch up with Europe. (1962;312) . . . Let us decide not to imitate Europe; 
let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try 
to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing 
to triumphant birth . . .  
Significantly, he added: 
Humanity is waiting for something from us other than such an imitation, 
which would be almost an obscene caricature..(314) . . .But if we want 
humanity to advance a step further, if we want to bring it up to a different 
level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we 
must make discoveries . . . For Europe, for ourselves, and humanity, 
comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, 
and try to set afoot a new man (314-315). 
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 Fanon makes a distinct statement and offer of a new “particular”, a new way of 
conceiving the human, a new way of thinking which is offered relative to a pre-existing 
one which he adjudges as deleterious. The relevance of this Fanonian “radicalism” for 
the discipline of technology is corroborated by the fact that the anti-colonial “particular” 
exposited by Cesaire, was articulated more explicitly in 1906 by South African nationalist, 
Pixley Ka Seme, in his iconic “The Regeneration of Africa” award-winning speech at the 
University of Colombia (in Karis and Carter 1972, 69-73), a speech which Kwame 
Nkrumah deemed significant to read in full at the 1962 First Conference of Africanists 
(Ngqulunga 2017, 17). Against the exuberance of a New York City in the throes of the 
second industrial revolution and his Zululand still under colonial subjugation, Seme 
courageously asserted that “the African is not a proletarian in the world of science and 
art” (Karis and Carter 1972, 69). He proceeded to declare that “the regeneration of Africa 
means that a new and unique civilisation is soon to be added to the world” and that 
“the most essential departure of this new civilisation is that it shall be thoroughly 
spiritual and humanistic – indeed a regeneration moral and eternal” (ibid., 71).  Both 
Fanon and Seme maintained that there is a unique and irreplaceable place for a 
particular, counter-vailing African world view with its peculiar philosophy of science and 




5. Concluding Reflection 
This chapter has endeavoured to register the conditions for a status quaestionis on the 
state of Africa in the light of how the global economic and commensurate ontic-
ontological consequences accompanying the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) are 
intertwined. Veering into a methodological prism grounded on the utilisation of the 
philosophical-phenomenology method, I have cryptically isolated these psychic-
ontological effects of technology as the compelling reason for the urgency to engage 
in an anti-colonial technoscientific appraisal of the current import and cultural 
appropriation of artificial intelligence technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
  The basis of the status quaestionis proposed here, that is, the peculiar historical 
and current geocultural position of Africa that justifies an Afrocentric focus on the 4IR, 
is impelled by a conviction that, despite the cultural and epistemic pillage of her past, 
Africa has resiliently retained an intellectual prowess necessary to make a contribution 
to the world from her inexhaustible and unique heritage. As proclaimed by Nkrumah, 
in his first speech at the founding summit of the Organization of African Unity, Addis 
Ababa, 24 May 1963, and archived in the African Union’s Science, Technology  and 
Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024: 
We shall accumulate machinery and establish steel works, iron foundries 
and factories; we shall link the various states of our continent with 
communications; we shall astound the world with our hydroelectric 
power; we shall drain marshes and swamps, clear infested areas, feed the 
undernourished, and rid our people of parasites and disease. It is within 
the possibility of science and technology to make even the Sahara bloom 
into a vast feld with verdant vegetation for agricultural and industrial 
developments. (African Union 2014, 5) 
This revived focus should ensure that Africa’s contribution to STI (Science, Technology 
and Innovation), ipso facto de-centres mainstream scientific discourse and 
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technological innovation, and pluriversalise7 this into a multicultural open-ended global 
project, Cesaire’s “universal” that is constructed by all “particulars” without losing the 
singular particularity of Africa.  
The Afrocentric perspectives alluded to in this chapter, in the spirit of Fanon, 
must resolutely be self-affirming and bold experiments on ways and means of infusing 
an African perspective on the theoretic considerations on education, the design 
philosophies, engineering, and distribution of technology. This new approach should 
be achieved through catalysing several multi-disciplinary and inter-linked studies drawn 
through both qualitative and quantitative methodological practices that can produce 
tangible results, that is,  paradigms that can cogently theorise the ramifications of the 
fourth industrial revolution on African self-knowledge and social ontologies. 
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